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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN D. O'CORNELL and ANN
O'CONNELL,
Plaintiffs and
Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
/CROSS-APPELLANTS
:

v.

:

Case Mo. 970361-CA

BLUE CROSS AMD BLUE SHIELD
OF UTAH,

:

Priority No. 15

Defendant and
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellees/cross-appellants, hereinafter "O'Connells",
agree with the appellant's statement as to jurisdiction
Brief of Appellant at 1, with the addition that the August 8,
1997, Order of this Court also indicated that the O'Connells'
cross-appeal was properly before this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AMD STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Issues on Appeal and Cross-Appeal
The issues involved in the appeal and the cross appeal
are essentially the same and the discussion throughout this
brief applies to both the appeal and cross-appeal except
where noted in Subsections 2 and 3 of Point II and in Point
III

of the Details of the Argument.
1.

Those issues are:

To which arbitration language, contained in the

various documents relied upon by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of

Utah ("BCBSU"), did the O'Connells agree in writing.
This issue was raised by the O'Connells throughout the
exchange of memoranda below.

See R-5-7, R-113-114, R-123-

125# R-225-227.
2.

Did the district court correctly interpret the

language of the arbitration agreement in determining which
disputes, if any, were subject to arbitration, and which
disputes, if any, were not.
The issue as to the scope of the disputes covered by the
arbitration agreement was raised by both parties throughout
the

exchange

of

memoranda

below

and

was

particularly

addressed by the O'Connells at R-121-122, 124, R-194-195, R229.

The issue as to whether the O'Connells

in that

agreement unequivocally waived their constitutional rights
to legal remedies and access to the courts was raised at R46, 50-52, 115.
3.

Should The District Court be Directed to Award a

Reasonable Attorney's Fee for the District Court Proceedings
and This Appeal.
This issue was not raised in the district court or in
this

Court

until

the

Conclusion

of

BCBSU's

Brief

of

Appellant.
B. Standards of Review
Factual

findings underlying

2

arbitration

issues are

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, Buzas Baseball
v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1996), while
interpretation of the arbitration agreement language is a
legal conclusion which is reviewed without deference to the
trial

judge's

interpretation.

Ibid.: pocutel

Olivetti

Corporation v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc.. 731 P.2d 475, 479
(Utah 1986).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Article I of the Constitution of Utah provides in
relevant part:
Sec. 11 [Courts open - Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.
The Utah Arbitration Act, as published in the Utah Code
Annotated/ provides in relevant parts:
78-31a-3.
A written agreement to submit any existing or
future controversy to arbitration is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds
existing at law or equity to set aside the
agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided in
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

3

78-31a-4.
(1)
The court, upon motion of any party
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement,
shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue
is raised
concerning
the
existence
of
an
arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters
covered by the agreement, the court shall
determine
those
issues and
order
or
deny
arbitration accordingly.
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under
the alleged arbitration agreement is involved in
an action or proceeding pending before a court
having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel
arbitration, the motion shall be made to that
court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a
court with proper venue.
(3)
An order to submit an agreement to
arbitration
stays any action or proceeding
involving an issue subject to arbitration under
the agreement. However, if the issue is severable
from the other issues in the action or proceeding,
only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed.
If a motion is made in an action or proceeding,
the order for arbitration shall include a stay of
the action or proceeding.
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate
may not be grounded on a claim that an issue
subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault
or grounds for the claim have not been shown.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal and cross-appeal of a series of orders
that ultimately

granted

in part and denied

in part the

defendant BCBSU # s motion to compel arbitration of the issues
raised by the O'Connells' Complaint.
this

legal

because

action

BCBSU

seeking

canceled

The O'Connells brought

equitable

their

4

relief

long-standing

and

damages

group

health

insurance for reasons of health.

Their complaint alleged

that BCBSU breached the applicable subscriber agreement and
a another, separate and specific, oral and written agreement
and violated a constructive duty of fair dealing.

In the

alternative, the O'Connells' complaint sought equitable
relief and damages because the individual conversion policy,
provided by BCBSU to the O'Connells upon termination of the
group policy, failed to conform to the requirements of the
terminated

subscriber agreement and the premiums BCBSU

demanded were based upon the O'Connells' health history in
violation of the state insurance statutes. R-l-8.
B. course of the Proceedings
The defendant, BCBSU, responded to the O'Connells'
Summons and
arbitration.

Complaint by bringing
R-9-11.

a motion to compel

During the protracted exchange of

memoranda on the motion (R-12-180), BCBSU asserted that the
O'Connells had agreed to arbitrate all their claims and at
various stages proposed a number of different documents as
evidence of that agreement, upon some of which BCBSU at this
point no longer appears to be relying.

The 0/Connells in

their memoranda, supported by affidavits, disputed that they
had read or even received some of these documents or that
BCBSU was bound by others and alleged that the arbitration
agreement contained

within the

5

"Application" which Ann

0/Connell signed in 1993 should not be construed to cover the
various causes of action asserted in their Complaint. R-4661; 112-126; 127-134. BCBSU ultimately supported some of its
factual claims with affidavits attached to Defendants Reply
to Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition. R-172177.
After hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the
district court entered the Court's Ruling of October 8, 1996,
granting BCBSU's motion to compel arbitration.

R-183-191.

(Addendum A) . The district court at that time found that the
O'Connells were not bound by arbitration language that was
contained within an endorsement, that BCBSU claimed it had
sent to all subscribers in 1986, because there was nothing in
the record showing that the O'Connell's had read or even
received it and a unilateral pronouncement by one of the
parties could not constitute an agreement to arbitrate. R186. (Addendum, A-4).

However, the district court did find

that the O'Connells had agreed to arbitrate because of the
"clearly

worded

and

unambiguous"

arbitration

language

contained within the "Application" signed by Ann O'Connell in
September 1993.
Addendum D).

Ibid. (That "Application" is attached in

The district court further found that, because

BCBSU had rejected a later "Application" that was signed by
John O'Connell, the arbitration language in that document

6

could not constitute a mutual agreement to arbitrate. R-187
(Addendum, A-5).

The district court stated that it did not

reach the issue of whether the Subscriber Certificate, that
BCSCU claimed it sent to the O'Connells,

M

also provided

plaintiffs with additional notice of BCSCU's arbitration
policy."

Ibid.

The O'Connells thereafter timely moved to amend or
clarify the Court's Ruling of October 8, 1996.

Following a

further exchange of memoranda, the district court issued its
Court's Ruling of December 18, 1997, in which it found that
the arbitration language in the "Application11, to which the
court had found the O'Connells agreed, "does not extend to
any existing controversy, it is specifically limited to
matters 'concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable
under the subscriber agreement.'"
The

court

further

found

that

R-206 (Addendum, B-3).
one

of

the

O'Connell's

alternative claims—the claim that the individual conversion
policy,

that

BCBSU

furnished

to

the

O'Connells

upon

termination of their group coverage, did not conform to the
insurance statutes—was not within the scope of the terms of
the agreement to arbitrate.

Ibid.

Therefore, the court,

pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act, Section 78-31a-4(3),
severed the statutory compliance issue from those to be
arb itrated.
BCBSU

Ibid.
timely

filed

a motion
7

to

reconsider

and a

supporting memorandum in which it once again invoked the
broader arbitration language contained within the Subscriber
Certificate, in addition to that within the "Application11
signed by Ann O'Connell, and requested that the court order
all issues in the litigation be arbitrated. R-210-211.
C. Disposition in the Court Bftlov
In the Court's Ruling of April 8, 1997, the district
court's ruling on BCBSU's motion to reconsider and its final
ruling on the motion to compel arbitration, that court "once
again" found "that the application signed by the plaintiff,
Ann O'Connell, does not provide for arbitration of the
plaintiff's independently arising statutory rights pursuant
to Utah Code Section 31A-22-701-718."

The court stated

further:
Furthermore, the Court would clarify that its
decision to sever the instant matter from
arbitration does not stem from a lack of faith in
the merits of arbitration, or any hesitancy to
have an arbitrator hear matters involving
statutory interpretation.
Rather, the Court's
decision is based on its belief that it is not
appropriate to arbitrate an issue concerning an
independently arising statutory right which was
not addressed by the arbitration provision
contained
within the defendant's
insurance
application.
R-249 (Addendum C-2).

The court ordered BCBSU to "file an

Answer within ten (10) days addressing those issues in the
plaintiff's Complaint concerning statutory claims they might
have under Utah Code, Section 31A-22-701-718." The district
8

court, citing Section 78-31a-4(3) of the Utah Arbitration
Act, stayed the arbitration, rather than the litigation, as
to the other issues. Ibid.J
D. Relevant Facts
In order to determine which of the disputes involved in
this litigation, if any, the O'Connells agreed to arbitrate,
it is necessary to understand the sequence of events, the
nature of the O'Connells' claims and their factual and legal
underpinnings, and the various documents claimed by BCBSU to
constitute the "written agreement" by the O'Connells to
arbitrate each of those claims.
The

O'Connells

have

continuously

carried

health

insurance provided by BCBSU for over twenty years and,
perhaps, for as long as twenty-seven years, and paid many
thousands of dollars in premiums to BCBSU.2 R-l. A critical

lf

The O'Connells had informed the trial court that the proper procedure under the statute,
Sec. 78-31a-4(3), where issues have severed, is to stay the court proceedings as to the matters
to be arbitrated and order the defendant to answer the complaint as to the other claims. R230, 231. BCBSU, while opposing any severance of the issues, took no position regarding
whether the arbitration or the litigation should be stayed if the issues were severed. Since
the statute clearly provides for staying the litigation as to the issues to be arbitrated, the
O'Connells believe that the trial court simply misspoke itself and inadvertently stayed the
arbitration instead. BCBSU brought this appeal before the apparent mistake could be brought
to the trial court's attention.
^ e O'Connells alleged that they had carried the insurance with BCBSU for over twenty
years and BCBSU does not appear to dispute that. See App. Br. at 3. The O'Connells
9

condition

of that

coverage, as it is with any health

insurance coverage, was BCBSU's agreement not to terminate
coverage by reason of any condition of the O'Connells'
health. R-l.

Ann O'Connell suffered a serious illness in

1989 and her medical bills for that year exceeded the
deductible on the health policy and BCBSU had to actually pay
money out.3
Prior to September 1993# the O'Connells had obtained
their coverage from BCBSU through the Utah State Bar.

In

1993, the O'Connells discussed with BCBSU changing their
coverage from the Bar group to the Rowland Hall\St. Mark's
School group because Ann O'Connell was then employed there on
a year-to-year contract.

Because of her 1989 illness, and

the importance of maintaining continuity of coverage over the
long-term, Ms. O'Connell sought and obtained oral and written
assurances from BCBSU that transfers back and forth between

intended to explore the actual length of the relationship in discovery but believe it began in
1970 when John O'Connell went into private practice. The O'Connells seek to continue that
relationship because, like most Americans who are past middle age and not employed by an
economically powerful entity, they are without any other choice. R-129.
^ e O'Connells alleged in their complaint that BCBSU effectively terminated their
insurance for reasons of health in a 1995 letter in which BCBSU based its action upon "your
claims history and/or your current health" (R-3) but, at that time the O'Connells were unaware
of whether BCBSU was motivated by Ann O'Connell's health problems in the late ^CXs or
John O'Connell's health problems in 1994, that also cost BCBSU some money, or perhaps
both. The O'Connells intended to explore this question in discovery but will accept BCBSU's
representation in its brief that BCBSU rejected the O'Connells' resubscription in 1995 "based
on Mrs. O'Connell's medical history." App. Br. at 5.
10

different BCBSU groups would not involve medical underwriting
and that time in a previous BCBSU group would be credited to
time in the new group. That is, BCBSU agreed that converting
from one BCBSU group to another would not constitute becoming
a new applicant and BCBSU would allow such transfers back and
forth without regard to health history and without a period
of

exclusion

for

pre-existing

conditions,

conditions

ordinarily imposed upon new applicants for BCBSU's insurance
coverage. R-2, R-128. It is the violation of this specific
oral and written agreement, separate and apart from any of
BCBSU's

printed

subscriber

certificates

or

health

agreements,4 which constitutes the basis for the O'Connells'
primary claim against BCBSU and which the O'Connells believe
is the

furthest

outside

the

scope

of any

arbitration

agreement.
Relying upon the aforementioned assurances by BCBSU and
following the instructions of BCBSU's agent,

Ann O'Connell

signed and submitted the September 1993 "Application" and
cancelled the Bar group coverage to effectuate the agreedupon transfer of BCBSU's continuing health coverage from the
Bar group to the Rowland Hall group. R-2, R-127. It is this
application which contains the arbitration language, in the
4

None of BCBSU's printed documents specifically address the question of whether or not
subscribers can transfer BCBSU's health coverage between groups, or at least do not do so in
any understandable form.
11

midst of the finely-printed boiler-plate above the signature,
that the district court found to constitute the O'Connells'
written agreement to arbitrate. R-186, R-205-206, R-248. (A
copy of the "Application" appears in Addendum D.)
BCBSU claims that it sent to Ann 0'Connell, at some
unknown time after she submitted the 1973 "Application",5

a

Subscriber Certificate that BCBSU calls the "Rowland Hall-St.
Marks

Health

Agreement"

throughout

its

Brief.

6

The

5

The affidavit submitted by BCBSU does not say when the Type 5E4 certificate was sentjust that it "was sent to the subscriber after being enrolled for the policy issued through St.
Mark's Rowland HalT-and it does not say whether BCBSU has a specific record of it being
sent to the O'Connells or whether the affiant based her conclusion on a general practice. R174. The copy of the Type 5E4 certificate, that BCBSU submitted to the district court along
with the affidavit, has "updated 6-94" hand-written on the cover (R-163) which would make ii
questionable that it was sent to the O'Connells, if it at all, much before Ann O'Connell's
employment at Rowland Hall terminated in August, 1994. Ann O'Connell submitted an
Affidavit in which she stated that the Subscriber Certificate that she had in her file was a
Type 4M-ML rather than the Type 5E4. R-129. The O'Connells asserted that the
introduction to the arbitration language in the Type 4M-ML was different from that in the
Type 5E4 and more consistent with their interpretation of the arbitration language in the
"Application." R-124-125, see "D Member Grievance Procedure", R-133.
"The document itself, which BCBSU introduced into the record at R-163 is entitled
"Subscriber Certificate for Group Medical Benefits, Type 5E4." Considerable confusion is
caused by BCBSU's habit of inconsistently interchanging the terms: "policy", "subscriber
certificate", "health agreement"and "subscriber agreement." BCBSU's practice of not placing
the date and using codes rather than group titles on its documents causes even more serious
confusion. For example, even if BCBSU had sent the Type 5E4 certificate to the O'Connells,
there would have been no way the O'Connells could tell by looking at the documents whether
the Type 5E4 or 4M-4ML was the applicable document for a particular group or period. In
the district court, BCBSU attempted to explain the system of identifying its documents in a
employee's affidavit with questionable success. See R-172-175. This encrypted identification
system of course is of no use to the subscribers.
12

0/Connells stated by Affidavit of Ann O'Connell that she had
a different version of that subscriber certificate in her
file and, in any event, had not read either version of the
subscriber certificate.7 R-129. BCBSU never claimed that Ann
O'Connell had a subscriber certificate for the Rowland Hall
group in her possession at the time that she signed the
"Application11 in September 1993#8 and there is no evidence
whatsoever in the record that either of the O'Connells ever
indicated in writing that they agreed to the arbitration
terms contained therein.
Ann O'Connell's employment at Rowland Hall terminated in
August 1994, but the Rowland Hall group coverage continued
for a period by operation

of federal

law. R-3.

The

0/Connells then requested a transfer of their BCBSU coverage
back to the State Bar group.

BCBSU had John O'Connell

submit another HApplicationM which it subjected to medical
underwriting and rejected for medical history reasons in
breach of the specific promises it made when it induced the
O'Connells to leave the Bar group in September 1993, and
despite

the

fact

that

the

medical

history

it

found

unacceptable apparently occurred while the O'Connells were
7

See note 5, supra.

8

BCBSU claims that the Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate (the Rowland Hall Subscriber
Agreement) "was sent to the subscriber after being enrolled for the policy issued through St
Mark's Rowland Hall/' R-174.
13

members of the Bar group a number of years before.

Thus,

BCBSU effectively cancelled the O'Connells long-standing,
continuous health insurance coverage because of a change in
condition of health which occurred while the O'Connells were
covered by BCBSU's non-cancelable insurance.
Because the O'Connells were terminated from the Rowland
Hall group and BCBSU reneged on its promise to allow them to
transfer back to the Bar group, and because it is virtually
impossible to obtain health insurance elsewhere after one has
been

refused

coverage

for health

reasons

(R-129),

the

O'Connells were forced, after the filing of this action and
under

protest,

to

individual policy.

convert

their

coverage

In their Complaint,

to

a

BCBSU

the O'Connells

alleged that BCBSU agreed, in the Subscriber Certificate for
the Rowland Hall group, to provide individual coverage upon
termination

of the

group

coverage without

evidence of

insurability or without conditions pertaining to health at

9

See note 3, supra. BCBSU represents, in the Brief of Appellant at note 2, that due to a
change in federal law, the O'Connells can now obtain coverage through the Bar group without
respect to health condition. BCBSU made this same representation to the O'Connells in a
letter, but when the O'Connells made further inquiry, BCSU's attorney of record replied in a
letter, dated September 30, 1997: "However the Bar policy now has annual enrollment
periods, so absent a special enrollment period, vou would not be able to obtain Bar coverage
until May 16. 1998." (Emphasis added). Even if BCBSU does not change its policy between
now and May, and the O'Connells do obtain coverage through the Bar, that would not moot
the cause of action for breach of the agreement to allow the O'Connells to transfer back to the
Bar group because the O'Connells' claim for foreseeable, consequential damages (R-5, 8),
would remain.
14

rates reasonably related to age or class of risk other than
risk due to health condition.

R-3-4.

The Complaint also

alleges that the Utah Insurance Code, Sections 31A-22-704
through 717, mandated

such an individual conversion policy

and prohibited basing the premium of a conversion policy upon
conditions related to health. Ibid. The O'Connells alleged
that the conversion policy offered to them

(and since

provided) failed to conform to the subscriber certificate and
also violated the Utah Insurance Code. The O'Connells sought
relief for these causes of action in the alternative to the
relief sought for the refusal to allow the O'Connells to
transfer back to the Bar group. R-3-4, 6-7.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The district court found that the O'Connells agreed to
the

narrow

arbitration

language

contained

within

the

"Application11 signed by Ann O'Connell in September 1993.
BCBSU argues that the O'Connells should also be bound by the
broader language appearing in the Type 5E4 (Rowland Hall)
Subscriber Certificate.

However, there is no indication

whatsoever in the record that the O'Connells had read that
document prior to this dispute arising or had ever agreed to
its contents.
Utah law favors enforcing arbitration agreements, but
JL5

only where the party moving to compel arbitration can show
that the other party unequivocally waived the constitutional
rights to legal remedies and access to the courts and agreed
in writing to arbitrate the dispute in question.

BCBSU

failed to prove that the O'Connells agreed in writing to any
arbitration language other than the narrow language in the
"Application11

and the district court's finding on this

underlying factual issue should not be disturbed.
The arbitration

language

in the

"Application" was

contained within an adhesion contract and therefore should be
interpreted against the insurance company that drafted it and
as an ordinary purchaser might reasonably understand it. The
district court correctly interpreted that language to not
require arbitration of the O'Connells' claim that BCBSU's
conversion policy failed to conform to the State Insurance
Code.
The

district

court

incorrectly

interpreted

the

arbitration language, which by its terms applied only to
disputes between the insureds and the carrier or medical
providers "concerning the applicability of, or benefits
payable under the Subscriber Agreement," to cover all the
rest of the O'Connells claims.

That language in context

might reasonably be understood by an ordinary purchaser of
insurance

to refer

to disputes

regarding

what

medical

procedures are covered by the insurance and the extent to
16

which medical provider's fees would be paid.
The O'Connells' causes of action that BCBSU breached a
specific promise, made separately

from the subscriber

agreement, to allow them to transfer between BCBSU groups,
and violated the long standing guarantee against cancelling
the insurance for health reasons and the constructive duty of
fair dealing which arose out of the long-term relationship,
do not raise disputes "concerning the applicability of, or
benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement."
O'Connells' claims, that

BCBSU breached

the

The

subscriber

agreement itself by cancelling their long-standing health
insurance and failing to provide a comparable individual
conversion policy at reasonable rates, are not claims that an
ordinary purchaser might reasonably understand as being
disputes between the purchaser or medical providers and the
carrier concerning "the applicability of or benefits payable
under the Subscriber Agreement."

Furthermore, as to all of

their claims, the arbitration language in the "Application"
does not unequivocally show that Ann O'Connell waived the
O'Connells' constitutional rights to their legal remedies and
access to the courts.
BCBSU failed to raise its request for attorney's fees
below.

Attorney's fees are discretionary and should not be

awarded to BCBSU in this instance.
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DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT

Point I: The Only Arbitration Language That The O'Connells
Could

Have Agreed

to Was That

Contained

in The

1993

"Application."
The district court found that the O'Connells were bound
by the relatively narrow arbitration language contained
within the "Application" signed by Ann 0#Connell in September
1993. However, BCBSU continues to assert that the O'Connells
are also bound by the broader arbitration clause contained
within the Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate (R-162, 165) which
BCBSU calls the "Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Health Agreement."10
The O'Connells disputed that they had read this document and
questioned that they had even received a copy before this
dispute arose. R-129, 225-226; See note 5, supra.

More

importantly, there is no indication whatsoever in the record
that the O'Connells ever agreed to the arbitration language
within this document or had a copy of it in their possession
at the time Ann O'Connell

signed the "Application" in

September 1993.
The district court stated, at one point, that it did not
10

See note 6, supra. BCBSU does not challenge, in the Brief of Appellant, the district
court's rejection of BCBSU's attempts below to rely upon the arbitration language contained
in other documents as constituting the O'Connells' agreement to arbitrate.
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reach the issue of whether the Subscriber Certificate also
provided the O'Connells with additional notice of BCBSU's
arbitration policy. R-187. However, the district court went
on to make it clear that it was holding the O'Connells only
to the more limited language of the "Application."

R-187-

188, 206, 248-249 (Addenda A, B & C) . The district court did
so

despite BCBSU's repeated invocation of the broader

language in the Type 5E4 Certificate. R-139, 143, 210-211.
The district court did not find that the O'Connells had
actually received the Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate; nor
could it have done so based upon the affidavits in the
record.11 However, even if there were some evidence that the
O'Connells had received a Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate
while they were enrolled in the Rowland Hall group, that
evidence would

not

compel

a

factual

finding

that the

O'Connells had agreed in writing to the broad arbitration
language within that document.

As the district court

correctly stated with regard to the language within another
document that BCBSU claimed it sent to its subscribers in

11

The district court at one point stated that the O'Connells were mailed a subscriber
certificate (R-184), but that court did not make a finding as to what version was sent or when
it was sent or that it was received by the O'Connells who raised questions as to all those
matters. See note 5, supra. The O'Connells continued to dispute the fact that they had
received the Type 5E4 certificate (R-225-226), relying upon Ann O'Connells' previously filed
Affidavit. R-127, 129.
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1986:
Because the record does not reflect whether
plaintiffs read or even received the 1986
Endorsement, the Court cannot find that it bound
them to arbitration.
At the very least, some
written agreement or document of understanding
must exist between two parties in order to compel
arbitration. Utah Code Ann. 78-3la-3 (1992). This
Court finds that the unilateral proclamation or
amendment mailed by one party to the other in this
case did not constitute an agreement to arbitrate.
R-186.
The Utah Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of a
"written

agreement

to

submit

controversy to arbitration11.

any

existing

or

future

Section 78-31a-3, Utah Code.

The party making a motion to compel arbitration must show the
existence of that written agreement. Section 78-31a-4(l),
Utah Code. The Arbitration Act also provides a mechanism for
determining

the

scope

of

the

issues

covered

by

the

arbitration agreement and for severing those so covered from
the ones not covered.

Section 78-31a-4, Utah Code.

There is no question but that BCBSU is correct that Utah
law favors arbitration and provides for enforcement of
arbitration agreements. Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co. ,
636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981) . However, it is written agreements
to arbitrate which are freely and mutually entered into
between the parties, and not unilateral pronouncements of
just one of the parties, that Utah law enforces.

In Lindon

City, supra at 1073, the Utah Supreme Court quoted with a
20

approval the Washington appellate court in King County v.
Boeing Co, 570 P.2d 713 (Wash. App. 1977), to the effect that
arbitration clauses should be construed liberally.

BCBSU

cited to that quotation in its Brief of Appellant at p. 15.
However, it must be noted that that quotation contains an
important qualification:
Arbitration is a contractual remedy for the
settlement of disputes by extrajudicial means. It
is a remedy freely bargained for by the parties,
and "provides a means of giving effect to the
intention of the parties, easing court congestionf
and providing a method more expeditious and less
expensive for the resolution of disputes." There
is a strong public policy in favor of such a
remedy, but it should not be invoked to resolve
disputes that the parties have not agreed to
arbitrate.
636 P.2d at 1073.

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, in

Lindon City, supra. also stated:
Under Article I, Section 11 [access to courts
and remedy by law] a party may intentionally and
deliberately waive the ordinary and usual remedy
to which a party is entitled for the redress of a
wrong, but such waiver should be expressed in the
most unequivocal terms.
636 P.2d at 1074 [Footnotes deleted, bracketed material and
emphasis added].
Thus, it is not simply a question of whether or not
BCBSU

provided the O'Connells with some notice of BCBSU's

arbitration policy.

The party moving to compel arbitration

must prove that the other party unequivocally

waived her

legal remedies and right to access to the courts and agreed
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in writing to arbitrate the dispute in question.

The

district court found that the O'Connells agreed to the
arbitration language in the "Application."

However, BCBSU

simply failed to prove in the district court that the
O'Connells agreed to the broader arbitration language in the
Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate (the version of the "Rowland
Hall-St. Marks Health Agreement11 replied upon by BCSU in its
Brief).

This is an underlying factual matter rather than a

question of interpretation.

Surely, it was not clearly

erroneous of the district court to decline to find on this
record that the O'Connells had agreed to the writing in the
latter document.

Point II:

The District Court Correctly Interpreted the

Arbitration Agreement to Mot Apply to the Statutory Claim But
Incorrectly Interpreted it to Apply to the Other Claims and
to Constitute a Waiver of Legal Remedies and Access to the
Courts.
The arbitration language in the "Application", to which
the district court found the O'Connells agreed, states:
I accept Binding Arbitration as the method of
resolving any disputes arising between me or the
covered family members and the Plan or a
participating
provider
concerning
the
applicability of, or benefits payable under the
Subscriber Agreement.
R-162 (Addendum D) . On its face, this language clearly does
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not constitute an agreement to arbitrate any dispute between
the parties, nor does it constitute an agreement to arbitrate
any dispute touching upon or related in any way to the
subscriber agreement.

It is limited in scope to disputes

between the O'Connells and the Plan (presumably BCBSU) or the
medical

providers

"concerning

the applicability

of, or

benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement."
Ann O'Connell in her Affidavit, submitted below (R-127128),

stated

that

she would

interpret

the

arbitration

language in the "Application" to apply to disputes as to
whether a particular medical bill would be paid and not that
she would have no recourse to the courts and to a jury if
BCBSU cancelled the insurance or refused transfer between
groups for health reasons. She stated further that she would
not have understood "binding arbitration" to mean that the
decision of the arbitrator would be final and unreviewable by
a court even if legally or factually wrong.

It is submitted

that Ann O'Connell's interpretation is the more correct
interpretation or, at the least, is an interpretation that an
ordinary purchaser of insurance could reasonably come to in
the circumstances.

It would not be unreasonable for such a

person to believe that when the application for health care
insurance spoke of disputes between the patient, the medical
providers and the health insurance plan "concerning the
applicability of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber
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Agreement" it contemplated disputes about such questions as
what medical procedures were covered by the health plan, what
doctor's or hospital fees were reasonable, how much of those
fees are payable by the patient and how to compute the
deductibles.

1. Principles of Interpretation
In Lindon Citv v. Engineers Const. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070
(1981), the Utah Supreme Court stated that doubts about
whether a claim is arbitrable should be resolved in favor of
the parties freedom to contract and quoted the Washington
Supreme Court to the effect that there is a strong public
policy in favor of arbitration.

636 P.2d at 1072-1073.

However, as discussed more fully in Point I, at 20-22, supra,
that quotation in Lindon Citv specifically made that policy
in favor of arbitration applicable only to disputes that the
parties had actually agreed to arbitrate.

The Lindon Citv

decision also stated that waiver of the constitutional rights
to legal remedy and access to the courts "should be expressed
in the most unequivocal terms.M

636 P.2d at 1074.

It is significant that the arbitration language in
Lindon City was contained within a contract that was drafted
in its entirety by the City which then refused to arbitrate
when a dispute arose with a contractor. That is the opposite
to

that

which

occurred

here,
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where

the

rather

murky

arbitration language was placed within the boiler-plate of a
document that was drafted by BCBSU, the party that is now
seeking an expansive interpretation of that language.
In Docutel Olivetti Corporation v. Dick Bradv Systems,
Inc. . 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court
reiterated the policy in favor of arbitration, "when the
parties have agreed not to litigate" citing and quoting
Lindon City, supra.
language

involved

As in Lindon City, the arbitration

in Docutel was drafted by the party

attempting to avoid arbitration and therefore it was a simple
matter to determine that that party had agreed to resolve the
dispute by arbitration and had waived access to the courts.
Furthermore, the Docutel decision held that, even if there
was ambiguity regarding the scope of disputes covered by the
arbitration agreement, that ambiguity should be resolved
against the drafter:
Docutel drafted the agreement, and we
interpret ambiguities in it against the drafter.
Park Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d
918, 920 (Utah 1982).
This principle of
interpretation is particularly appropriate when,
as here, the ambiguity could have easily been
avoided. If Docutel had intended to exclude any
provision from the arbitration clause, it could
have done so simply by adding the phrase "except
as provided in paragraph 10" to the arbitration
clause.
731 P.2d at 479.

In the instant case, BCBSU drafted the

arbitration agreement and, if it wanted the 0'Connells to
waive their legal remedies and recourse to the courts and
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have any future dispute between them and BCBSU submitted to
private arbitration, it could have simply had the 0#Connells
sign a statement which clearly and unequivocally so stated.
While the "Application" for coverage is not itself an
insurance policy, it should be interpreted under the same
rules applicable to insurance policies because it was drafted
by an insurance carrier and was not subject to negotiation
between the customer and the carrier.

Utah law recognizes

that an insurance contract is a "classic example of an
adhesion contract" which is prepared by attorneys for the
company. There is usually no discussion of the terms. The
terms would not be fully understood by the insured even if
they were read. And it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis

without

any

bargaining.

Therefore,

"that

interpretation is to be placed upon the words of the policy
which is most favorable to the insured" and they "should be
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the
insured because they are adhesion contracts drafted by the
insurance companies. . . . Because insurance policies are
intended for sale to the public, the language of an insurance
contract must be interpreted and construed as an ordinary
purchaser of insurance would understand it."

U.S. Fidelity

and Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 519, 521-523 (Utah 1993)
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(Citing and quoting a long line of Utah cases).12
In Wheeler v. St. Joseph's Hosp.f 63 Cal. App. 3d 345,
133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977), the California Court of Appeals
held, in the alternative to a finding of unenforceability
under that state 's rules concerning conscionability, that the
arbitration language in an agreement between a patient and a
hospital was ambiguous and therefore not applicable to a
malpractice action. The arbitration language there specified
that it applied to "any legal claim or civil action in
connection with this hospitalization, by or against hospital
or its employees or any doctor of medicine . . . "

133 Cal.

Rptr. at 779, n.2. The court said:
While to one trained in the law the clause "any
legal claim or civil action" may fairly and
reasonably
be
seen
as
including
medical
malpractice claims, an ordinary person, even if he
read the paragraph, might well assume that it only
related to disputes over hospital bills.
Ibid, at 790. The court went on to conclude:
Resolving the ambiguities in favor of the patient,
the "ARBITRATION OPTION" should not extend to
malpractice claims against
"any doctor of
medicine" absent some explanation to the patient

12

In Sandt the Utah Supreme Court held that the carrier of an underinsured motorist
policy could not reduce the amount payable by the amount paid by the responsible party's
liability insurance carrier in spite of a provision stating: "[T]he limit of liability shall be
reduced by all sums paid . . . on behalf of persons . . . who may be legally responsible." The
court found ambiguity was introduced by another provision that states: "[A]ny insurance we
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible
insurance." 854 P.2d at 521.
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at the time he signed the admission form of the
intended scope to the arbitration provision. The
evidence
is
uncontradicted
that
no
such
explanation was given in the instant case.
Ibid, at 791.

A patient signing an arbitration agreement

upon entering a hospital might be thinking in terms of
payment problems rather than a legal action against a doctor
for negligence.

Even more likely, one purchasing health

insurance would be thinking about disputes about what medical
expenses the insurance will cover rather than anticipating a
termination of the health insurance,

yet alone, a breach of

a separate promise or a violation of the Insurance Code by
the insurance carrier. The arbitration language in the BCBSU
"Application11 is far narrower than that in Wheeler because,
by its terms, it does not apply to Many legal claim or civil
action" but only to disputes "concerning the applicability
of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement."13
It is far more reasonable to believe that the latter language
applied just to disputes concerning what medical procedures
and expenses were covered by the health policy and whether or
not they were fully reimbursable than it would be to conclude
that "any legal claim or civil action" did not include
malpractice actions.
13

It must be borne in mind that it is undisputed that the CConnells did not have a copy
the Rowland Hall Subscriber Agreement in their possession at the time that Ann O'Connell
signed the "Application" so that the contents of the subscriber agreement could only have
been a matter of speculation for her at that time.
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Turning now to whether the particular claims made by the
O'Connells in this litigation raise disputes that are within
the scope of the arbitration language in the "Application",
it should be borne in mind that the substantive validity of
those claims is not now before this Court.

The issues here

are whether Ann O'Connell, by signing that

M

Application,"

agreed to arbitrate each of those claims and unequivocally
waived the O'Connells' constitutional rights to their legal
remedies and access to the courts.

2. The Statutory Claim Involved in The Appeal
The district correct was correct in finding that the
O'Connells did not agree to arbitrate their claim that the
conversion policy, furnished to the O'Connells after the
termination of the Rowland Hall group policy, failed to meet
the standards required by the Utah Insurance Code.

Since

that claim

clearly does not come within the scope of the

relatively

narrower

arbitration

language

within

the

"Application11 because it does not directly concern "the
applicability of, or benefits payable under the [Rowland Hall
group] Subscriber Agreement", BCBSU must rely upon the
broader arbitration language within the terminated Subscriber
Agreement itself. BCBSU then strains to make the O'Connells'
statutory

claim

one

concerning

the

construction,

interpretation, performance or breach of the Subscriber
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Agreement in order to bring that claim within the scope of
the that broader language.

BCBSU attempts to do so by

arguing that, because the Insurance Code requires that group
insurance policies conform to the code and BCBSU puts the
terms of its policy in its "Subscriber Agreement/1

any

attempt to enforce the Code must be an attempt to enforce the
11

Subscriber Agreement.M u
BCBSU's argument fails for two reasons. First, as shown

in Point I of this brief, the district court did not find
that the O'Connells had agreed to the broader arbitration
language in the Subscriber Agreement.

Second, it fails

because the Code imposes a duty to provide a conversion
policy that meets the Code whether or not the language in
BCBSU's document describing the policy complies with the
Code. Surely BCBSU cannot avoid its responsibility under the
Code by ignoring the Code in drafting its documents.

The

duty to provide a conversion policy that meets the Code
requirements arises by statute and arises independently of
the language contained in the Subscriber Agreement itself.
The O'Connells' right to a conversion policy that conforms to
the Insurance Code would exist even if BCBSU had put nothing
14

For this rather convoluted argument, BCBSU relies upon Sec. 31A-22-703, reprinted in
Br. App. at 2, which requires that group insurance policies conform to the requirements of the
rest of the Insurance Code. The right to a conversion policy at premiums set without regard
to conditions of health is guaranteed in Sec. 31A-22-704 which in turn was relied upon by the
O'Connells in their Complaint. R-3.
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in its Subscriber Agreement concerning a conversion policy.
Furthermore, the fact that the Rowland Hall Subscriber
Agreement may also impose a similar duty to provide a
conversion policy does not make the O'Connells' separate
claim, that the conversion policy provided by BCBSU does not
conform to the Code, one for breach of that Subscriber
Agreement, yet alone a claim concerning Mthe applicability
of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement."
BCBSU also argues that because the O'Connells would not
be entitled to a conversion policy under the Insurance Code
had they not been previously covered by a group policy, their
claim

"necessarily

presupposes"

and* "contemplates"

the

existence of a group policy and, therefore a "Subscriber
Agreement".

However, the O'Connells did not agree, by

signing the "Application", to arbitrate any issue touching
upon the Subscriber Agreement.15

BCBSU must do more than

establish some remote nexus between the O'Connells' claim
and the terminated Subscriber Agreement to remove the claim
from the purview of the courts. Again, if BCBSU wanted the
0/Connells to agree to arbitrate any dispute touching upon,
or

which

"contemplates"

the

15

prior

existence

of,

the

Again the test is how an ordinary purchaser of insurance would interpret the arbitration
language in the "Application" and such a purchaser would be unlikely to be contemplating the
Insurance Code itself, yet alone, to be compelled to connect that Code to the terminated
subscriber agreement by the logic of the "ERISA analogy" as suggested by BCBSU. See
App. Br. at 14.
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Subscriber Agreement,
subscribe to

it could have had the 0/Connells

language that clearly so stated.

3. The Claims Involved in the Cross-Appeal

The O'Connells, by way of their cross-appeal, assert
that the district court erred in interpreting the arbitration
language of the "Application" to apply to the rest of their
claims.

The O'Connells' primary claim, that BCBSU breached

its separate oral and written promise to allow the O'Connells
to transfer back and forth between groups, is clearly not a
dispute "concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable
under the Subscriber Agreement."

That claim does not even

touch upon the Rowland Hall Subscriber Agreement.

It is

based upon BCBSU's separate promises, made in telephone
conversations and confirmed

in writing, upon which the

O'Connells relied when they transferred to the Rowland Hall
group.

Patently,

neither

the

O'Connells

request

for

equitable relief nor their claim for consequential damages
for the anxiety forseeably induced by BCSU's breach of this
separate agreement are disputes "concerning the applicability
of, or benefits payments under the Subscriber Agreement."16
16

It is not at all clear whether BCBSU would agree that an arbitrator could award
consequential damages for breach of an agreement separate from the Subscriber Agreement or
whether BCBSU would contend that the arbitrator is limited to enforcing the Subscriber
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Likewise, the 0/Connell/s claims, that BCBSU breached
its long-standing promise to not terminate the coverage for
health reasons and the constructive duty of fair dealing
which arose out of the long term relationship, are not
disputes

"concerning

the applicability

of, or benefits

payable under the [Rowland Hall] Subscriber Agreement."
While it could argued that those claims might "touch upon"
the Rowland Hall Subscriber Agreement because that agreement
evidences a small portion of the long-term relationship and
because that

Subscriber Agreement also contained a similar

guarantee against termination because of health condition,
those claims nonetheless are not literally claims concerning
the

"applicability

of,

Subscriber Agreement."

or

benefits

payable

under

the

At the very least, those claims are

not within the interpretation that an ordinary purchaser
could reasonably place on that arbitration language, that is,
that it applied only to disputes as to whether particular
medical procedures are covered and the extent to which
payments would be made to medical providers.
More problematic, perhaps, are the O'Connells' claims
that BCBSU breached the Rowland Hall Subscriber Agreement by
refusing to allow the transfer, by cancelling the group

Agreement itself and could only require payment of "benefits payable under the Subscriber
Agreement" since that is the language used in the arbitration clause in the "Application".
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coverage for health reasons and by failing to provide a
reasonably comparable conversion policy, because those claims
are based directly upon a breach of the terms of the
Subscriber Agreement itself. Nonetheless, those claims are
again

not

disputes

that

an

ordinary

purchaser

would

necessarily understand as falling within the arbitration
language in the "Application11, that is, disputes between the
patient and the plan or the medical providers "concerning the
applicability of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber
Agreement."

4. Waiver of Constitution Rights as to All Claims

It is not clear whether BCBSU is claiming that the
O'Connells have waived altogether any remedy not specifically
provided

in the Subscriber Certificate, such as their claim

for consequential damages for breach of BCBSU's separate
promise to allow the 0,Connells to transfer back to the Bar
group (R-5, 8), or whether BCBSU is merely arguing that all
such claims should be decided by a private arbitrator.17

In

either event, a waiver of the constitutional rights to legal
remedies, access to the courts and jury trial would be
involved.

However,

the

arbitration

17

See note 16, supra.
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language

in

the

"Application"

utterly

fails

to

meet

the

separate

constitutional test of expressing "in the most unequivocal
terms" that the O'Connells were waiving their rights to
access to the courts and remedy by law guaranteed by Article
I, Sections 7 and 11, Constitution of Utah. See, Lindon City
v. Engineers Const. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Utah 1981).
The arbitration language, quoted infra at 22, says not one
word about giving up rights to legal remedies and access to
court and jury, yet alone expressing that waiver "in the most
unequivocal terms."

It is instructive to compare this

complete absence of any waiver notice in the fine print
arbitration language of BCBSU's "Application" with the waiver
notice which

appeared

in the very

detailed

and

clear

arbitration agreement in Sosa v. Paulos. 299 Utah Adv. Rep.
26, 27 (Sup. Ct. 1996)18:
NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE
AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING
UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE
ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.

18

In Sosa. the Utah Supreme Court adopted the two-stage test for finding an arbitration
clause unenforceable because of unconscionability. The O'Connells are not now claiming that
the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable. They are saying that
the language under which Ann O'Connell's signature appears did not contain a waiver of
rights to legal remedies, access to the courts and jury trial and are suggesting how such a
waiver might appear in order to be unequivocal.
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It is respectfully submitted that the district court
should have denied BCBSU#s motion to compel arbitration with
regard to all of the claims stated

in the 0/Connells

complaint because those claims do not fall with within the
scope of the arbitration language to which the court found
the O'Connells agreed and, further, because there was no
clear and unequivocal waiver by the O'Connells of their
constitution rights to legal remedy and access to the courts.

Point III: This Court Should Not Direct the District Court
to Enter an Award for BCBSU's Attorney's Fee.

BCBSU asks this Court to direct the trial court to enter
an award to it for reasonable attorneys' fees for the
proceedings in the district court and for this appeal. BCBSU
makes that request for the first time in the Conclusion of
its Brief of Appellant and does so without citation to the
record or argument other than a passing citation to Section
78-31-16 (1997).

Since BCBSU did not make a request in the

district court for attorney's fees in connection with the
proceedings there, it is precluded from raising that matter
for the first time on appeal.

See, e.g., Sukin v.Sukin. 842

P.2d 922, 926 (Utah App. 1992).
Furthermore the statute relied upon by BCBSU makes the
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matter discretionary with the court and the district court
should have the option of deciding that the equities militate
against awarding any attorneys' fees to BCBSU.19

Therefore

even if the matter were timely and properly before this
Court, the Court should not preclude the district court from
exercising its discretion in the matter.
Since BCBSU fails to give any reasons for its requests,
even for attorneys' fees in this Court, it is difficult for
the O'Connells to provide counter-arguments.

However, it

should be noted that the O'Connells did not initiate the
appellate process and that they believe that their arguments
are sound and, even if they do not prevail, the issues are
at the least close ones.

The question of whether an

Insurance Carrier may, in the manner that BCBSU has attempted
to do so, unilaterally exempt itself from

having important

issues, including its statutory obligations, decided publicly
in

the

courts

jurisdiction.

is

one

of

first

impression

in

this

Awarding attorneys' fees to BCBSU in these

circumstances will have a chilling effect and discourage
consumers from attempting to settle legal questions of import
to the public.

19

The district court might conclude, for example, that an award for attorneys fees is
inappropriate because BCBSU did not even raise the agreement and argument upon which it
initially prevailed until its reply memorandum below and made a number of meritless
arguments and confused the record with irrelevant documents.
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CONCLUSION
BCBSU failed to establish that the O'Connells agreed in
writing to any arbitration language other than the narrow
language contained in the "Application." The district court
correctly

interpreted

that

language

to

exclude

the

0/Connells/ statutory claim but incorrectly interpreted it to
include the other claims made in the Complaint and to
constitute a waiver of the O'Connells Constitutional rights
to legal remedies and access to the courts.

Accordingly,

this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting
the motion to compel arbitration as to any of the claims. In
the alternative, this Court should remand with instructions
to

sever the

issues that this

Court

finds

should

be

arbitrated from those that it finds should not.20
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of February,

1998.

)HN D. 0'CONNELL
Attorney for Appellees/Cross-Appellants

20

If severance is ordered, the litigation should be stayed as to the matters to be arbitrated
and arbitration and litigation should both go forward. See note 1, supra.
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ADDENDUM A
Court's Ruling, October 8, 1996. R-183

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN D. O'CONNELL AND

:

COURT'S RULING

ANN O'CONNELL
Plaintiffs,
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation
Defendant.

Civil No. 960901038CV
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
:
:

This case concerns the plaintiffs' right to rejoin a medical insurance group policy.
The matter came before the court for hearing on June 13, 1996, on defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration. The Court heard argument on that date and took the matter under
advisement. After a careful review of the pleadings, facts, law, and consideration of the oral
argument, the Court grants the defendant's motion to compel arbitration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The uncontroverted facts set forth in plaintiffs' and defendant's memoranda reflect
that approximately fifteen years ago, Plaintiff, John O'Connell, began receiving health
insurance coverage from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU") through a group policy
issued to members of the Utah State Bar ("USB"). Neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant
have asserted that the initial health care policy include any provision requiring binding
arbitration of disputes between BCBSU and its subscribers. However, in January of 1986,
BCBSU modified its health care agreements by mailing its customers an endorsement
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requiring future disputes between BCBSU and its subscribers to be settled through binding
arbitration. (Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, at 2).
In the late Summer of 1993, plaintiff, Ann O'Connell contacted BCBSU and inquired
about the possibility of changing from the USB group policy to the Rowland Hall St. Mark's
("RHSM") BCBSU group policy. Based upon a BCBSU's representative's assurances that
changing group policies within the BCBSU system would not subject the plaintiffs to medical
underwriting and that they would be credited for their enrollment time under the prior policy,
plaintiffs cancelled the USB policy and switched to the RHSM group policy. (Complaint, at
2).
In order to make the switch to the RHSM group policy, plaintiff, Ann O'Connell, was
required to fill out an application for membership. While plaintiff, Ann O'Connell, does not
specifically remember reading nor filling out the application, she does recognize the signature
on the application as her own. (Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, at 2).
After filling out the application, the plaintiffs were mailed a subscription certificate
containing details of the RHSM policy. Plaintiffs coverage under the RHSM group policy
started on October 1, 1993, and continues today under an individual conversion policy issued
by BCBSU. (Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, at 4).
In May of 1995, plaintiff, John O'Connell, attempted to switch coverage from the
RHSM policy back to the USB policy. Plaintiff filled out a new Utah Bar BCBSU
application but was subsequently denied coverage. Plaintiffs initiated legal action against the
Defendant on February 12, 1996, alleging a breach of contract and statutory obligations to
the plaintiffs. On March 4, 1996, defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration with the
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Court. After receiving several memoranda regarding the motion to compel arbitration, the
Court set the matter for a hearing on June 13, 1996. At the June 13 hearing the Court heard
oral arguments from counsel and took the matter under advisement.

ISSUES;
L

Whether the plaintiffs assented to BCBSU's arbitration policy?

II.

Whether the BCBSU arbitration provision is valid?

LEGAL ANALYSIS
I.

PLAINTIFFS ASSENTED TO BCBSU'S ARBITRATION POLICY.

The plaintiffs contend they never agreed to submit to BCBSU's arbitration policy. On
the other hand, BCBSU asserts the plaintiffs either clearly assented, or are deemed to have
assented, to arbitration and are estopped from arguing otherwise. In finding the plaintiffs did
assent to binding arbitration, the Court has carefully examined each of the following
documents or transaction between plaintiffs and defendants:
Plaintiffs Pre-1986 BCBSU Health Care Agreement
The facts of this case show that between the time plaintiffs first joined the BCBSU
Bar Group Policy until the January 1986 Endorsement, plaintiffs were not aware of any
agreement to arbitrate disputes with BCBSU. This is supported by all of the uncontroverted
facts provided to the Court.
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The January 1986 Endorsement to BCBSU Health Care Agreements
The Court finds the 1986 Endorsement to BCBSU Health Care Agreements did not
constitute plaintiffs' agreement to arbitration. Because the recprd does not reflect whether
plaintiffs read or even received the 1986 Endorsement, the Court cannot find that it bound
them to arbitration. At the very least, some written agreement or document of
understanding, must exist between two parties in order to compel arbitration. Utah Code
Ann. 78-3la-3 (1992). This Court finds that the unilateral proclamation or amendment
mailed by one party to the other in this case did not constitute an agreement to arbitrate.
The September 1993. RHSM Group Application and Subscriber Certificate
The Court next examines the September 1993, RHSM group application. This onepage application contains a standard arbitration provision placed directly over the area
bearing the plaintiff, Ann O'Connell's signature. The Court finds the arbitration provision to
be clear, plainly worded, and unambiguous. The Court also finds that by signing the
application the plaintiff assented to BCBSU's arbitration policy.
Plaintiffs have argued that they should not be subject to arbitration because they did
not read the subscriber certificates or the applications they signed, and thus did not have
notice of the arbitration provisions. The Court is not compelled by this argument as it
relates to the application. The case law is clear that a party has a duty to read and
understand the terms of a contract before signing it. Hottinger v. Jensen. 684 P.2d 1271,
1274 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, the arbitration provision was contained within a onepage application and printed directly above the space bearing plaintiff Ann O'Connell's
signature. The provision should have been read by the plaintiff and constituted a valid
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agreement to arbitrate. After their application was accepted the plaintiffs were mailed a
subscriber certificate containing more detailed information about BCBSU's arbitration policy. J
Because we find the application constituted a valid agreement to arbitrate, the Court does not
reach the issue of whether the subscriber certificate also provided plaintiffs with additional
notice of BCBSU's arbitration policy
The May 1995. BCBSU Bar Group Application
The Court finds the May 1995, BCBSU Bar Group Application bearing plaintiff, John
O'Connell's, signature did not constitute plaintiffs consent to submit to arbitration. Once
again, the Utah Arbitration Act clearly states that a written agreement must exist in order to
compel a party to arbitration. Utah Code Ann. 78-31a-3 (1992). Because BCBSU rejected
the 1995 application which was submitted by the plaintiff there was no mutual assent, and
thus no agreement to arbitrate. The Court finds that BCBSU is precluded from using the
provisions of a rejected application as a means of compelling the plaintiffs to binding
arbitration.
H. THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN THE 1993 RHSM GROUP POLICY
APPLICATION IS CLEARLY WORDED, UNAMBIGUOUS, AND THUS
VALID.
The Utah Arbitration Act provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration
is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or
equity to set aside the agreement . . .
Utah Code Ann. 78-3la-3 (1992).
Plaintiffs contend that because the arbitration provision in the 1993 RHSM application
is inconspicuously positioned in fine print and contained within an adhesion contract, it ought
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not be enforced. However, the determinative issue in this case is not whether the arbitration
provision was contained in an adhesion contract or written in fine print, but whether the
provision itself existed and is valid. For example, if an insurance contract's language is
uncertain, ambiguous, or otherwise invalid, it will be construed in favor of the insured.
American Casualty Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co.. 568 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1977).
For contract language to be considered ambiguous it must be "capable of more than
one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or
other facial deficiencies'." Wiengar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).
Furthermore, the court in United States Fidelity and Guarantee v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 519 (Utah
1993), determined that a "reasonable purchaser" of insurance standard should be used in
determining whether an insurance policy provision is ambiguous. 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah
1993).
The arbitration provision in the 1993 RHSM group policy application was located
directly above the line bearing plaintiff, Ann O'Connell's, signature, and states:
I accept binding arbitration as the method of resolving any disputes arising
between me or the covered family members and the Plan or a participating
provider concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable under the
Subscriber Agreement.
The Court finds that the arbitration provision in the 1993 application was clearly
worded, unambiguous, and not subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. The
Court believes that a reasonable purchaser of insurance would be able to read the provision
and easily understand that he/she was agreeing to submit any disputes to binding arbitration.
Plaintiffs have cited several cases from other jurisdictions where arbitration provisions
contained within adhesion contracts were found to be ambiguous and thus unenforceable.

A- 6

See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp.. 63 CaL App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976);
Obstetrics and Gyns. v. Pepper. 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985); and Broemer v. Abortion
Servs. of Phoenix. 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992). Each of these cases involves a factual
scenario where a patient was required to sign an arbitration agreement immediately prior to
receiving medical treatment. A similar case was recently heard by the Utah Supreme Court
in Sosa v. Paulos. 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1996).
In Sosa. the court refused to uphold an arbitration agreement which was signed by the
plaintiff just one hour before she was operated on by the defendant. The plaintiff, who had
already been undressed and was waiting in her surgical clothing, was handed three different
forms, one of which was the agreement to submit any medical malpractice claim to
arbitration. Id. at 26. The court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and
substantially unconscionable.
The Court, while carefully considering the reasoning set forth in the four cases cited
above, finds the facts of the instant case to be significantly different. The common link
between the above cases is that they involved the signing of an agreement to arbitrate which:
• was entered into immediately prior to receiving medical treatment,
• provided the patient with little or no time to reflect upon the terms and conditions
of the agreement,
• involved plaintiffs who were in pain, or at least in a more vulnerable or susceptible
mental state.
In contrast, the plaintiffs in the instant case were in a much different situation. They
were not required to sign the arbitration provision as a prerequisite to receiving immediate
care. In fact, plaintiffs themselves initiated the change from one medical plan to another.
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There are no exigent circumstances of any type alluded to by the plaintiffs to justify or
explain their present reading of the application. Additionally, in the instant case the plaintiffs
were free to take as much time as was needed to examine and Teflect upon the terms of the
contract. The plaintiffs here were not forced to make a decision when they were in pain or a
more vulnerable mental state commensurate with the plaintiffs in the cases cited above.
The Court finds the plaintiffs agreed to settle their claims with BCBSU through
binding arbitration. The Court also rules that the arbitration provisions contained in the 1993
BCBSU application is valid and worded in a way a reasonable purchaser of insurance would
comprehend. Furthermore, the Court also finds that no public policy grounds exist which
would prohibit the resolution of this matter through binding arbitration. Therefore,
defendant's motion to compel arbitration is granted.
Counsel for the defendant is to prepare Findings and an Order consistent with, but not
limited to, this Ruling within ten days.
Dated this 8th day of October, 1996.
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ADDENDUM B
Court's Ruling, December 18, 1996. R-206

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN D. OCONNELL and,
ANN O'CONNELL,
Plaintiffs

COURT'S RULING

Case No. 960901038
vs.
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF
UTAH,
Defendant.

Honorable Leslie A. Lewis

This case concerns the Plaintiffs right to rejoin a medical insurance group policy. This case
is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Clarify the Court's October 8, 1996,/ruling.
Having carefully considered the relevant facts, pleadings, and law, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend or Clarify and modifies its judgment accordingly.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 8, 1996, this Court granted the defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in this
case. The Court found that by signing the Rowland Hall Blue Cross application, the plaintiffs were
bound by the arbitration clause contained within that application. On October 16, 1996, plaintifF
moved to Amend or Clarify the Court's Ruling, asserting that plaintiffs' independent statutory right
to appropriate medical coverage pursuant to Section 31A-22-707 is not subject to the arbitration
clause in this case. Defendant filed a timely objection to the Motion, arguing that all the issues in this
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case, including the statutory rights asserted by the plaintiff, are appropriate for arbitration. Plaintiff
did not reply and submitted the matter for decision on October 28, 1996.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Utah Arbitration Act provides:
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the
agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration
accordingly, (emphasis added)
Utah Code 78-3 la-4(l).
The plaintiffs in this case assert that Utah Code Section 31A-22-707 requires the defendant
to provide them with an individual insurance policy upon termination from their group policy.
Plaintiffs argue that determining whether defendants have met this independent statutory obligation
is not an appropriate issue for arbitration, rather it should be decided by this Court. Plaintiffs set forth
two arguments in support of their contention: (1) they argue the language of the governing
arbitration clause in this case does not provide for arbitration of their statutory claim, and (2) they
contend that issues of statutory interpretation are best left to the Court and not to an arbitrator on
public policy grounds.
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Defendant argues that the plaintiffs statutory claim is appropriate for determination by an
arbitrator. Defendant contends the Utah Arbitration Act gives broad authority for arbitrators to
decide "any existing or future controversy."
This Court notes that the arbitration clause in this case does not extend to any existing or
future controversy, it is specifically limited to matters "concerning the applicability of, or benefits
payable under the subscriber agreement." Despite defendant's argument that the conversion policy
was "specifically referred to" in the subscriber agreement, the Court finds that the plaintiffs statutory
right arises independently and is not covered by the arbitration clause.
The Court finds the issue of whether defendant met its statutory obligation pursuant to the
applicable sections of 31 A-22-701(-)718 can be and is severed from the other issues in this case, and
amends its judgement accordingly. The Court finds that the language of the arbitration provision
signed by the plaintiff does not appear to address the issue of whether defendant has provided the
plaintiffs with a conversion policy in accordance to the statute previously mentioned. Further, even
if the arbitration provision specifically provided for the matter of defendant's compliance with the
statute, the Court has some reservations in leaving such issues of statutory interpretation to
arbitration.
In order to appropriately assess and determine whether defendant has met the obligations of
sections 31 A-22-701(-)718, the Court orders each counsel to prepare a supplemental memoranda
addressing the issue of whether the conversion policy issued to the plaintiff^satisfies the requirements
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of the statute. Plaintiff has 10 days from the receipt of this order to file a memorandum. Defendant
has an additional 10 days to respond after receipt of plaintiffs' memorandum. Plaintiff is also to
prepare a modified Order consistent with this Ruling, and the Court's October 8, 1996, Ruling.
Dated this 18th day of December, 1996.

DISTRICT COURT -JUDGp,*
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ADDENDUM C
Court's Ruling, April 8, 1997. R-248

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD tTUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COURT'S RULING

JOHN D. O'CONNELL and
ANN 0,CONNELL/
Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 960901038

vs.
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

This case

is before the Court

on defendant's Motion

to

Reconsider this Court's December 18, 1997, Ruling. Having carefully
considered the applicable law, facts, and counsels1 Memoranda, the
defendant's Motion is denied.
Once

again,

the

Court

finds

that

the

language

of

the

arbitration provision contained in the application signed by the
plaintiff, Ann O'Connell, does not provide for arbitration of the
plaintiffs1 independently arising statutory rights pursuant to Utah
Code Section 31A-22-701-718.

Clearly, the Utah Arbitration Act

authorizes this Court to examine the scope of the matters covered
by an arbitration agreement, and to sever from arbitration any
matters not within the scope of the agreement.
Section 78-31a-4(l).

See, Utah Code

The Court also finds that the issue in the

instant case is distinguished from those addressed in Buzas
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Baseball v, Salt Lake Trappers. 925 P. 2d 941 (Utah 1996) (examining
the role of the courts in reviewing arbitration awards under the
Utah Arbitration Act), and Shearson/American

Express. Inc. v.

McMahon. 42 U.S. 220 (1987) (discussing the applicability of the
Federal Arbitration Act) .
Furthermore, the Court would clarify that its decision to
sever the instant matter from arbitration does not stem from a lack
of faith in the merits of arbitration, or any hesitancy to have an
arbitrator

hear

matters

involving

statutory

interpretation.

Rather, the Court1s decision is based on its belief that it is not
appropriate to arbitrate an issue concerning

an

independently

arising statutory right which was not addressed by the arbitration
provision contained within the defendant's insurance application.
Pursuant to Section 78-31a-4(3) of the Utah Arbitration Act,
the Court stays arbitration and orders the defendants to file an
Answer

within

ten

(10) days

addressing

those

issues

in

the

plaintiffs1 Complaint concerning any statutory claims they might
have under Utah Code, Section 31A-22-70:U^SL8.
Dated this >S ^day of April, ^199

ilE A.' LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM D
"Application," September 1993. R-162
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